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Central Africa: Initiatives · Cameroon Forests · Gabon Forests · Publications & Maps · News

• 6 percent¹ of Cameroon's 22.8 million hectares of forests were allocated for logging in 1999-2000, including:

• Forty-seven ventes de coupe,^a covering 117,500 hectares, awarded in October 1999. Approximately one half of this area went to Cameroonian companies.

• Twenty-one² UFAs,^b covering almost 1.7 million hectares, were awarded through a June 2000 auction that drew bids from 48 companies.

• The French group, Rougier, received more concession area, almost 329,000 hectares, than any other group in June 2000.

• The top three concession owners in Cameroon are now Thanry (792,000 hectares), Rougier (400,000 hectares), and Bolloré (354,000 hectares). Holdings by these three predominantly French companies³ total almost 40 percent of Cameroon’s concession area.
  

• The government of Cameroon is expected to receive more than 5.1 billion CFA francs (US$6.5 million⁴) per year from the winning bids⁵ following the June 2000 UFA auction. This revenue increase per hectare is three times that from the 1997 auction.

• After granting the first 2 community forests in 1997, the Ministry of the Environment and Forests granted an additional 5 in 2000, covering 16,532 hectares6¹ and has received proposals for an additional 74.

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Introduction

Forest sector planning and management policies can help ensure long-term yields of timber products while minimizing the environmental and social costs of logging and other development. However, in many countries the lack of transparency and accountability in the forest sector often prevents their application. 

For instance, until 1997, logging concessions in Cameroon were allocated on a discretionary basis that did not ensure either adequate rent capture by the government or logging companies’ technical and financial means to carry out their operations. The lack of these elements resulted in substantial loss of revenue for the government and unnecessary environmental damage.⁷

When Cameroon introduced groundbreaking forestry legislation reform in 1994, followed by an implementation decree in 1995, it became the first country in Central Africa to plan concession allocation through open competitive bidding. The first round took place in 1997, but reported irregularities have hampered the forestry sector ever since. In an effort to increase transparency, an independent observer was appointed by the Government following a transparent selection process to monitor future allocations.⁸

Five types of permits grant logging rights in Cameroon. Exploitation permits and Autorisation de récupération are short-term volume-based logging titles reserved for nationals. Ventes de coupe are 2,500-hectare permits allocated for 1-3 years. Concessions (subdivided in Unités Forestières d’Aménagement) are large long-term titles. Licenses are medium-size to large logging titles, but they are no longer allocated or renewed. Some licenses, predating the new forestry code, are still valid but will expire soon. 

Further, Cameroon is the first Central African country to introduce community forests. Community forests are forest blocks of up to 5,000 hectares whose management is entrusted to local communities, with benefits accruing to them.

Cameroon's new forestry legislation is now being implemented by the recent allocation of new ventes de coupe, Unités Forestières d'Aménagement (UFA) and community forests. This document presents information on how these different logging rights were allocated in recent months and to whom. It is concurrent with the Global Forest Watch Cameroon mandate to make such information widely available to national and international audiences. Our assumption is that by promoting transparency and accountability in the forest sector, we can help ensure that Cameroon’s forest resources are managed in the public interest.

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About the Bidding Process

History

• Ventes de coupe⁹

In all, 103 ventes de coupe were to be allocated in 1999, although less than one-half were actually distributed.¹⁰ Eighty-five were placed on the auction block in January 1999,¹¹ and in October 1999¹² the government announced that 54 ventes de coupe had been allocated. Subsequently, seven were canceled because the bidding companies were unable to meet their financial obligations or failed to sign the final documents (see Table 1). Forty-seven ventes de coupe were therefore successfully allocated in 1999, leaving 56¹³ ventes de coupe from 1999 to be allocated in 2000 (see Figure 1). They were placed on the auction block in October 2000 (see Table 2).

Delays and confusion concerning the next^c allocation of ventes de coupe may be the result of the preparation of a new arrêté¹⁴ that grants preemption privileges to community forest projects when they overlap with ventes de coupe.¹⁵

• Unités Forestières d'Aménagement (UFAs)

(a) 1996-97: The first round of UFA allocations

In 1996, seven UFAs were allocated through a discretionary process, without being subjected to competitive bidding. In 1997, 26 UFAs were placed on the auction block for Cameroon's first competitive concession allocation, but the process was undermined by several irregularities. Among the 26, 2 were not allocated and one was ultimately revoked. Prior to June 2000, then, 30 UFAs with temporary logging contracts were scheduled to expire at the end of 2000. According to sources within the Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MINEF), several of them will probably not be renewed for a final long-term contract because many of the companies holding these UFAs failed to meet stipulations spelled out in their contracts.

(b) June 2000: The second round of UFA allocations

The Ministry of the Environment and Forests planned to allocate the following areas over the next three years, as spelled out in the 1999 planning document, Planification de l'Attribution des Titres d’Éxploitation Forestière:¹⁶

• For 2000-2001, 40 UFAs¹⁷ covering 2,881,751 hectares, including 36 assiettes de coupe^d covering 90,000 hectares, with a potential production of 1,350,000 m³ of wood per year.

• For 2001-2002, 13 UFAs covering 900,091 hectares, including 9 assiettes de coupe covering 22,500 hectares, with a potential production of 337,500 m³ of wood per year.

• For 2002-2003, 4 UFAs covering 204,662 hectares, including 4 assiettes de coupe covering 10,000 hectares, with a potential production of 150,000 m³ of wood per year.

The second round of UFA allocations was originally announced in December 1999.¹⁸ Various procedural problems^e delayed the start of the selection process until June 2000. Technical analysis of the bids was carried out until July. The financial bids opening session was public and the final results (see Table 3) were published by the Government in mid July 2000. An independent observer¹⁹ was appointed to document this allocation process. He reported that despite great improvements since 1997, the June 2000 UFA allocation suffered from:

• Insufficient data to assess the technical and other qualifications of bidding companies.

• Unresolved questions about the eligibility of bidding companies with a track record of management violations.

• Inconsistent, conflicting, and/or false documentation provided by bidders.

• Possible leaks on bidding status for some UFAs.²⁰

It should be noted that the June 2000 auction and the planned September 2000 auction differed from the plan set out in the original Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière in terms of which and how many UFAs were to be allocated in 1999-2000.²¹ But the World Bank, which has been influential by helping Cameroon implement its new forest policy through structural adjustment lending, claims that these irregularities are insignificant so long as the overall areas allocated on a yearly basis fall within the range of the document's plans, which they do so far. 

The UFAs originally set out to be allocated in 1999-2000 were not selected to take into account the vulnerability of unallocated forestland. The June 2000 UFA auction attempted to rectify this situation by allocating UFAs that were easily accessible and, therefore, were at risk from illegal logging.²²

(c) Forthcoming: The third round of UFA allocations

In July 2000, the Ministry also announced that 21 new UFAs were available for allocation (see Table 4). This offer is open to all logging companies registered in Cameroon. The minimum bidding price is at 1,000 CFA francs per hectare. Applications, including a financial and technical proposal, were originally due by September 15, 2000,²³ but as of December 2000, this auction had been postponed as a result of the Government's decision to fine-tune the technical criteria in light of the June 2000 allocation.²⁴

Community forests are part of the nonpermanent forest domain^f and are established through a management contract between the local community and MINEF. Under the terms of this contract, MINEF offers its technical expertise to help manage the forest resources in the interest of the community. This agreement is valid for 5 years and may be renewed.²⁵

Requesting and obtaining a community forest may be a long and complex process, especially for distant rural communities that are often unfamiliar with urban bureaucratic procedures. In short, local communities must submit a proposal to MINEF. Once it has been accepted, a management plan must be elaborated and a contract is then signed. To date, MINEF has granted 2 community forests in 1997 and another 5 in 2000 ²⁶ (see Table 5) and has received proposals for an additional 74. 

Thirteen of these proposals are likely to be approved soon, 39 are reserved for communities finishing their management plans, 11 proposals are incomplete, and 11 were rejected because they were located in the permanent forest domain, where community forests are not permitted.²⁷  It should be noted that there are no deadlines to request community forests and the numbers evolve constantly.

The allocation of ventes de coupe and UFAs is determined by a governmental body called the commission interministerielle d'attribution des concessions forestières. It includes representatives from different ministries (e.g., Environment and Forests, Economy and Finance), specific departments of the Ministry of the Environment and Forests, unions, experts called on an individual basis, and an independent observer. The selection criteria and procedures are ruled by Arrêté 0293/MINEF dated March 21, 2000 (see Annex 1). These criteria considered the following: investments, financial capacity, technical capacity, and respect for both prior commitments and the environmental legislation. A technical score and a financial score were given. The financial score was calculated by the following formula: financial bid x 100 / highest financial bid offered for that particular UFA or vente de coupe.²⁸

• Ventes de coupe

Technical scores were awarded out of a possible total of 120 points, and scores above 72 were required to qualify for the bidding process. The minimum bidding price was set at 2,500 CFA francs per hectare. The following formula was used to determine the winner for each vente de coupe: (technical score x 0.2) + (financial score x 0.8).²⁹

The next allocation of ventes de coupe is open to all logging companies registered in Cameroon (in theory, some earlier allocations were to be reserved for Cameroonian nationals). The minimum bidding price is 2,500 CFA francs per hectare. According to MINEF, the selection scoring system is to be harmonized to match that of the UFAs.³⁰

• Unités Forestières d'Aménagement

Technical notes were scored out of a possible 100, a score of 55 or below resulting in disqualification (see Annex 1 for details on technical criteria).

In the past, companies were required to pay only a small fraction of their financial offers, but this time the government required them to pay their full offers within the first year. As an accompanying measure, the base price for the financial bid was reduced from 1,500 CFA francs per hectare to 1,000 CFA francs per hectare. The following formula was then used to determine the winner of the bidding process for each UFA: (technical score x 0.3) + (financial score x 0.7).³¹ The World Bank favors the 3:7 ratio for the technical and financial score although reportedly the government and the private sector would prefer a more balanced ratio whereby technical scores factor more heavily.³²

The companies awarded UFAs had 45 days to pay the bidding price, but the deadline was extended at the request of bidders to September 30.³³ If companies failed to meet this deadline, the concession was to be awarded to the second company on the bidding list.

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Allocation Results

Ventes de coupe

• Area and revenues

The 47 ventes de coupe, awarded in October 1999, covered 117,500 hectares. The Est, Centre, and Sud provinces each encompass about one-quarter of the allocated ventes de coupe. Ventes de coupe represented less than 7 percent of the new concession area allocated between 1999 and 2000. The Cameroonian government theoretically received 506 million CFA francs (US$648,000) per year through the open auction allocation. The average winning bid was 4,296 CFA francs per hectare, ranging from 2,800 to 10,500.

Table 1 shows the outcome of the 1999 ventes de coupe allocation.

Most companies obtained only one vente de coupe, but eight companies received two. Notable among the eight was the Société Forestière Hazim (SFH), which made the highest bid per hectare at 10,500 CFA francs per hectare. SFH was excluded from the June 2000 UFA auction because it had been sanctioned by the government for illegal logging.³⁴

Table 6 shows how Cameroonian companies fared compared to foreign companies. The latter were awarded 47 percent of the ventes de coupe area. On average Cameroonian company bids were slightly higher than those of foreign companies, except for the Lebanese and the Belgian-owned corporations. Seven of these ventes de coupe were originally reserved for Cameroonians but were eventually allocated to foreign companies.³⁵

Forty-nine companies entered the auction during which 28 UFAs were scheduled to be allocated,³⁶ but 4 UFAs received no bids, and 3 UFAs were bidden on by companies that were ultimately disqualified. 20 companies received 21 UFAs,³⁷ covering almost 1.7 million hectares or 6³⁸ percent of Cameroon’s 22.8 million hectares of primary and secondary forests. Today, 17 percent of these forests are under a valid logging concession, and an additional 15 percent are planned for allocation in the next two to three years.³⁹ Abandoned, current and planned concessions cover at least 71 percent of Cameroon’s forests.⁴⁰

As a result of this bidding process, the Government of Cameroon is expected to generate more than 5.1 billion CFA francs (US$6.6 million) per year from the winning bids.⁴¹ In 1997, it received only 1 billion CFA francs (US$1.6 million)⁴² from the first UFA allocation. In 1997, the bids ranged from 400 to 5,000 CFA francs per hectare, but the range was 1,100-7,500 in 2000. The winning bids averaged 3,438 CFA francs per hectare up from 1,026 CFA francs in 1997, indicating logging companies’ high interests in access to forest resources.

The fiscal law for 2000-2001 stipulates that bidding revenues are to be shared among the government (50 percent), communes (local administrative units) (40 percent), and local communities (10 percent).

Table 3 details the bidding process for all the UFAs allocated at the June 2000 auction (also see Map 1 [PDF download]). Companies awarded contracts are highlighted in yellow. Almost one-quarter of the UFAs allocated had only one bidding offer.

As of October 10, 2000, three companies had failed to fulfill their bid obligations and "their" UFAs were allocated to the second highest bidder. INC was replaced by SCTCB for UFA 08.008, Ingénierie Forestière by SFIW for UFA 10.022, and Sofopetra by SN Cocam for UFA 09.015. The three new companies had until October 15, 2000, to pay.⁴³ As of December 2000, all the companies appear to have fulfilled their financial obligations and secured temporary contracts with the government for their newly acquired UFAs.

Ingénierie Forestière made the largest bid per hectare, accounting for the largest financial offer in this bidding round, and claimed the fifth biggest area (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 and Table 7). This company was created in 1998 and was mainly involved in log transport until this year. Ingénierie Forestière retracted its offer for UFA 10.022, which was subsequently awarded to SFIW, allegedly a partner of the Société Forestière Hazim. Reportedly, SFH will conduct logging operations for SFIW in UFA 10.022 and for Ingénierie Forestière in UFA 10.020.⁴⁴ If so, SFH, which was barred from obtaining new concessions in 2000 because of its documented illegal practices, may still be operating in new concessions this coming year.

Given the size of Ingénierie Forestière's current holdings, ownership information on this company is relevant. Government records show Ingénierie Forestière under the ownership of a Mr. Mataga and Mr. Rocher. But according to several sources within the Cameroonian NGO and the donor community, Ingénierie Forestière is ultimately controlled by a high-level political figure, who may have had previous ties to the timber industry, reportedly owning shares in another logging company, COFA. (As Table 8 indicates, the government recently fined COFA for logging outside its annual cutting area and prohibited its participating in the June 2000 UFA auction).⁴⁵ Ingenierie Forestière has denied such links.⁴⁶

The largest area allocated in this bidding round, 146,000 hectares, went to Cambois, a subsidiary of the French Rougier group. With its other subsidiaries, Rougier received almost 329,000 hectares of concession area during this auction. It leads in terms of total area allocated to a multinational group in June 2000, followed by Thanry, and Bolloré (see Figure 3). All three are French groups with a long history in the region. However, several experts have indicated that VicWood, a Hong Kong corporation, may now be among the largest shareholders of the Cameroonian subsidiary of the Thanry group.⁴⁷

The top three concession owners in Cameroon are now Thanry (792,000 hectares), Rougier (400,000 hectares), and Bolloré (354,000 hectares), totaling almost 40 percent of Cameroon’s concession area (see Table 9). If SFH’s alleged partnerships with Ingénierie Forestière, SFIW, and SFDB are true, in terms of companies actually engaged in timber extraction (subcontracting as well as owning concessions), Société Foretiére Hazim may now have access to the fourth largest concession area (350,000 hectares) in Cameroon.

Technical scores of companies participating in the June 2000 auction averaged 80 out of 100. One-half of the winning bidding companies scored below average, with scores ranging from 64 to 99. The highest technical score of bidding companies averaged 87 out of 100, ranging from 78 to 99. Only four of the winning bidding companies scored 87 or better.

When there were multiple bids on a concession, most winning companies ranked low on the technical score. (Only two winning bidding companies ranked first technically, and six were last or second to last when there were at least three bidders).

Eight companies⁴⁸ with active sawmills or sawmills in construction received a concession during this round. In the wake of instituting the first log export ban in Central Africa, Cameroon’s government is actively trying to promote its national timber processing industry. However, there are some indications that in doing so, Cameroon may be risking the creation of a processing capacity higher than what can be legally and sustainably harvested given the limited number of species in commercial demand.⁴⁹

Community Forests

• Area and revenues

The five community forests allocated in 2000 cover 16,532 hectares. According to the Soutien au Développement Durable de Lomié project,⁵⁰ it costs approximately 500,000 CFA francs for local communities to prepare a proposal requesting a community forest. The five communities awarded forests this year spent a reported combined amount of 4.5 million CFA francs, which also included the elaboration of management plans and basic maps.⁵¹

• Winners

Table 10 shows both the five communities awarded community forests in Cameroon in 2000 and the first two community forests granted in 1997.

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Progress in Implementing Concession Allocation Guidelines

MINEF plans on developing a permanent forest domain of 7 million hectares.⁵² The area under a valid logging contract in 2000-2001 increased to 4.1 million hectares, up from 4 million hectares in 1998/99.⁵³ Note that the net area increase is small owing to the fact that new concession allocation was balanced out by official expiration of several logging titles (ventes de coupe and licenses). The concession area dropped to 2.6 million hectares in 1999-2000 because, following the controversial 1997 allocation, no UFAs were allocated until a clearer mechanism was put in place in 2000. The vast majority of forest concession area is under an Unité Forestière d’Aménagement, and community forests represent less than 1 percent of the total (see Table 10). 

It should be pointed out that the areas discussed in this document account only for formal agreements between logging operators and the Cameroonian government regarding areas open to logging over time, not to areas that are currently logged. Some concession land may never be exploited because of poor access or excessive costs. In addition, this study does not account for areas illegally harvested by small- to large-scale operators and, as such, underestimates the actual extent of logging in Cameroon.

Considerable progress has been made in implementing logging concession allocation regulations since the new law was passed in 1994. The first UFA auction held in 1997 resulted in 21 concessions that were not awarded to the highest bidder.⁵⁴ Following complaints from donor organizations, from within the Cameroonian government, by the private sector, and by NGOs, more clearly defined guidelines were applied during the 1999 allocation of ventes de coupe. 

The independent observer’s report showed that the technical criteria were still open to misinterpretation. The rules were revised once again to ensure that no ambiguities remained. At first glance, the 2000 UFA allocation seems to have respected the allocation guidelines, demonstrating Cameroon’s ability to implement a complex market-based auction aimed at increasing rents captured from logging.

Several unanswered questions about the June 2000 UFA allocation remain:

• Why were some companies with a history of infractions allowed to bid for concessions while others were not? Several logging companies were disqualified from the bidding process (see Table 8) for various past illegal activities but others were not. In fact, two companies sanctioned by the government⁵⁵ for logging violations (SIBAF and COFA) were awarded new concessions. Why were companies known to violate the law awarded concessions?
  

• Were revenues lost because some bidding companies discovered they faced no competition? The independent observer's report suggests that because some bidders were aware that they had no competition for particular UFAs, they offered the lowest bid possible, thus lowering financial revenues for the government. By the time the government decided to demand payment of the full financial offer within the first year and to reduce the minimum bids to 1,000 CFA francs per hectare, the proposals had already been submitted to MINEF. Bidders were invited to retrieve their proposals in order to make changes following these decisions.⁵⁶ Reportedly, in the process of retrieving their proposals, some bidders realized that owing to the absence of other portfolios on hand, they had no competition and in response made only minimum bids.
  

• How appropriate is it for related companies (i.e., those under a single parent company umbrella) to bid on the same UFA, as was the case with the SFID and Cambois (both related to Rougier) bids on UFA 10.038? This could result in abuses. For example, two companies, A and B, registered independently but related to the same group of investors, could have an advantage over single companies under the following scenario: A offers the highest price the group of investors is willing to pay for a particular UFA while B offers a lower but still competitive bid. Assume that the bid of a third, unrelated, company is between those of A and B. A maintains its bid and ultimately wins the concession. But, if A and B are the top two offers, A could retract its offer, thereby allowing B to win the concession at a more affordable price. In either event, the parent company of A and B wins the concession and potentially has the option to drop the bid price later. Although there is no evidence of such a strategy in the last allocation, this technique could allow some companies to undermine government efforts to grant concessions to the highest bidders.
  

• When companies were excluded from the bidding process owing to past infractions, why did this restriction apply only to individual subsidiaries, rather than the entire parent company? For example, the Société Africaine de Bois was excluded from bidding because of past infractions; yet Jacques Prenant (not cited for infractions) was not affected, although both are part of the Thanry group, and subsidiaries are known to trade logs with one another. Advocates of the current allocation process argue that it would be unfair to penalize legally independent companies simply on the basis of common investors.⁵⁷ But, given the influence of these investors, shouldn’t a large group, like Thanry, be held accountable for the actions of all its subsidiaries?
  

• Despite greatly improved allocation procedure, why does it seem that qualification and ranking criteria of bidding companies were open for interpretation? Following the initial ranking by the commission interministerielle, 19 appeals were introduced by companies; 14 were rejected and 5 were ultimately considered. Four resulted in changes that in the end did not affect the final allocation decisions. Two are particularly noteworthy because they affect the potential disqualification of bidding companies.⁵⁸

• Société Forestière Hazim contested its disqualification, which was based on allegations of logging beyond the concession's boundaries. When, the commission interministerielle determined that it did not have sufficient documentation to rule on this case, it ordered an inspection team to assess the situation. This team included members of the government, representatives of the private sector, and an international NGO, Global Witness. It documented extensive illegal logging practices⁵⁹ and SFH was ultimately disqualified. Global Witness later conducted a second joint mission with the government in eastern Cameroon to assess legal compliance by companies, but the government has yet to release their report.
  

• INC was originally disqualified for repeated infractions, but that decision was overturned on the basis that the two citations were for different infractions, not for repeated similar infractions. INC eventually received an overall score of 76 and was awarded 08009. Several sources have indicated that INC and SFH are business partners.

In addition to these questions, other issues indicate that Cameroon’s forests may still be at risk from questionable enforcement of the law. For instance, there is evidence that SEFAC and SEBAC are interested in obtaining and logging UFAs 10 008 and 10 009⁶⁰ and that SAB and SEBC are interested in UFAs 10 005 ands 10 017.⁶¹ The government of Cameroon found these companies to be involved in illegal activities and barred them from participating in the June auction round. However, three of these UFAs were not scheduled to be allocated in June 2000.⁶² 

According to "Décision ministerielle fixant les modalités d'évaluation des engagements antérieurement pris," SEFAC, SEBAC, SAB and SEBC should be allowed to participate in future allocation rounds one year after their fines are paid. Hence, some may question the practicality of punishing these companies by excluding them from bidding on UFAs that they are probably not interested in anyway.⁶³

Despite these lingering questions, the Government of Cameroon has demonstrated a commitment to enforcing legislation on concession allocation in the face of corporate pressure and lost revenues. Two examples illustrate this point:

• Following the June allocation, some companies have pressured the government to modify the results of the auction for a few UFAs based on prior agreements signed between logging companies and MINEF that granted these companies preemptive privileges. Through one such agreement (signed in 1997), the logging company SOFOPETRA agreed to help develop a gorilla sanctuary in southern Cameroon and, in exchange, expected to receive concessions at the next allocation. SOFOPETRA tried to obtain UFAs 09015 and 09019 but was outscored and outbid and did not receive any concessions. The government allocated these concessions according to the guidelines that it had set and to date has refused to modify these results.⁶⁴
  

• MINEF disqualified or excluded eight logging companies from the bidding process on the basis of past infractions, including SFH, CTL, and SEFAC (see Table 8). As a result, the government lost revenues because SFH, CTL, and SEFAC were the only ones interested in three UFAs up for auction that were ultimately not allocated. It should be noted that the infractions listed in Table 8 resulted in a substantive loss of revenue in themselves. As the table shows, the government sought almost 500 million CFA francs (US$ 640,205) in lost value and interest from infractions committed by two companies. (We were unable to find out whether these fines had been paid.)

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Conclusion

Cameroon is moving ahead rapidly with the allocation of remaining unprotected and productive forestlands. In recent allocations (covering 1999-2000), the government has demonstrated a commitment to implementing elements of its new forest policy, in particular, those provisions relating to an open auction system whereby concessions were awarded to the highest bidder, with technical capacity as a factor. Unlike the first UFA allocations of 1997, which were fraught with irregularities, the June 2000 UFA allocations appear to have respected guidelines set out to regulate the process. In addition, similar guidelines are now being applied to smaller ventes de coupe, which were previously granted outside the auction system. 

These steps can help generate higher government and local communities revenues for forest resources. The effectiveness of these policies is borne out by the fact that the June 2000 UFA allocations generated approximately three times more revenue per year per hectare of forest concessions than the 1997 round of allocations.

The recent allocation process raised questions about the ability (and willingness) of some recipient companies to implement management regulations—to be good stewards of the forest—given their track records. As noted above, although some companies sanctioned for past illegal logging were excluded from the bidding process, others were allowed to participate. In addition, allocation regulations do not preclude companies with a track record of violating laws from subcontracting out to successful bidders in order to harvest their concessions.

Although several new players have emerged as major operators in the logging sector (notably Ingénierie Forestière), a small group of largely French-owned parent companies continues to dominate the industry. However, Cameroonian companies hold a slim majority of newly allocated ventes de coupes, and local populations are now empowered to manage their own forests, however small, with five new community forests allocated in 2000.

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ARTICLE 12 - (1) La répartition de la cotation affectée au critère ayant trait aux investissements existants ou programmés pour les ventes de coupe et pour les concessions forestières est fixée ainsi qu'il suit:

Pour les concessions forestières:

• Lorsque l'usine est déjà implantée et opérationnelle

  • Si elle est un complexe (au-delà de la première transformation, et séchoir) ou une unité de tranchage ou de déroulage. 25/25

  • Si c'est une usine de sciage et de deuxième transformation sans séchoir. 20/25

  • Si c'est une usine de sciage seulement. 15/25

• Lorsque l'usine est programmée

  • Si elle est un complexe (au-delà de la première transformation, et séchoir), ou une unité de tranchage ou de déroulage. 10/10

  • Si c'est une usine de sciage et de deuxième transformation sans séchoir. 5/10

  • Si c'est une usine de sciage seulement. 0/10

ARTICLE 13 - La répartition de la cotation affectée au critère ayant trait aux capacités financières est fixée ainsi qu'il suit

Pour les concessions forestières:

• Possession en propre ou en partenariat notarié dune usine de transformation opérationnelle ayant une capacité annuelle égale au moins à 50 % de la possibilité annuelle de coupe de la concession. 40/40

• Possession en propre ou en partenariat notarié d'une partie de l’usine et disponibilité d'une caution bancaire ou d'une ligne de crédit garantissant le financement intégral de la partie de l'usine restant à acquérir et à mettre en place. 25/40

• Disponibilité d’une caution bancaire ou d'une ligne de crédit garantissant le financement intégral de l'usine de
  transformation. 20/40

• Sans garantie financière. 00/40

ARTICLE 14 - La répartition de la cotation affectée au critère ayant trait aux capacités techniques et professionnelles est fixée ainsi qu’il suit:

Pour les concessions forestières:

• Expérience de l’entreprise en travaux forestiers: sur cinq (5) points

  • Plus de sept (7) ans d’expérience 5/5

  • Entre cinq (5) et sept (7) ans d’expérience 3/5

  • Entre trois (3) et cinq (5) ans d’expérience 1/5

  • Moins de trois (3) ans d’expérience 0/5

• Qualification du responsable des opérations forestières: sur cinq (5) points

  • Ingénieur forestier diplômé, de nationalité camerounaise 5/5

  • Ingénieur forestier diplômé, d'une autre nationalité 4/5

  • Technicien supérieur diplômé, de nationalité camerounaise 3/5

  • Technicien supérieur diplômé, d’une autre nationalité 2/5

  • Responsable d’exploitation non diplômé en foresterie et bénéficiant d’une expérience

    • de plus de cinq (5) ans 5/5

    • comprise entre quatre (4) et cinq (5) ans 3/5

    • comprise entre trois (3) et quatre (4) ans 1/5

    • de moins de trois (3) ans 0/5

• Sous-traitance

  • Pas de contrat de sous-traitance 5/5

  • Sous-traitance inférieure à 25 % des activités 2/5

  • Sous-traitance à plus de 25 % des activités 0/5

ARTICLE 15 - La répartition de la cotation affectée au critère ayant trait au respect des engagements antérieurement pris est fixée ainsi qu’il suit

Pour les concessions forestières:

• Unité de transformation installée entièrement et conforme à la programmation inscrite au cahier de charges 5/20

• Pas d’infractions mineures aux règles d’exploitation forestière, ni aux lois et règlements relatifs à la protection de l’environnement 5/20

• Pas de déséquilibre significatif de la situation financière de l'entreprise 5/20

• Réalisations sociales prévues dans le cahier de charges dûment constatées par les autorités compétentes 5/20.

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Annex 2

This document was given to Nels Johnson for WRI's internal review and to the following external reviewers: Alain Chaudron, Yvan Cusson, Laurent Debroux, Louis Djomo, Klaus Mersman, Parfait Mimbini, Roger Ngoufo^*, Dieudonne Nguele, Filip Verbelen^* and Ursule Zang. An asterisk denotes a reviewer who was unable to comment on the document. The external reviewers are associated to donor agencies, Cameroon’s government, and civil society, but acted in their personal, not institutional capacity. The external reviewers’comments were submitted by email to the authors or during meetings held in Cameroon with the authors.

Notes

^a A type of logging permit.
^b Unité Forestière d'Aménagement, a type of logging permit.
^c As this document went to press, we were informed that forty-seven ventes de coupe were awarded in January 2001. GFW was unable to review this allocation in time for this document.
^d An assiette de coupe is based on the annual allowable cut.
^e The 1997 allocation of UFAs was plagued by irregularities (see GFW's report An Overview of Logging in Cameroon); to avoid similar problems in 1999, the allocation procedures had to be more clearly defined. This need resulted in arrêtés 0757 dated June 1999, 0276 dated March 13, 2000, and 0293 dated March 21, 2000.
^f Areas zoned for potential conversion.

¹ This 6 percent represents 1.4 million hectares, but is actually an underestimation because the calculation only accounts for mapped UFAs. A few UFAs and all ventes de coupe were not counted in this calculation. In addition, the area calculation is based on spatial (GIS) data whereas the areas discussed in this document are based on reported area by the government.
² Based on Rapport de synthèse de l’ouverture des propositions techniques et administratives par la Commission Interministerielle d'Attribution des Concessions Forestières.
³ According to several French forestry experts, Hong-Kong based, VicWood, now owns a significant portion of Thanry's shares.
⁴ Converted from CFA francs: US$1 = 781 CFA francs, from www.oanda.com on October 19, 2000. This rate is applied to all other conversions in this document.
⁵  Based on Rapport de synthèse de l’ouverture des propositions techniques et administratives par la Commission Interministerielle d'Attribution des Concessions Forestières.
⁶ Décision 1305 D/MINEF/DF/CFC du 23 octobre 2000.
⁷ J. Brunner and F. Ekoko, "Cameroon’s Case Study," in The Right Conditions: The World Bank, Structural Adjustments and Forest Policy Reform (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000).
⁸ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, January 2001.
⁹ An auction for 147 ventes de coupe was announced in late February 2000, but for reasons that have yet to be determined, they were never allocated. This auction was rescheduled in July 2000, but again it did not take place.
¹⁰ Yvan Cusson (Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts), private communication, December 2000.
¹¹ Avis d’appel d’offre No. 31/AAO/MINEF/DF/SDEIF/STEF du 8 janvier 1999.
¹² Arrêté No. 1147/A/MINEF/DF du 13 octobre 1999.
¹³ MINEF’s document "Réaménagement #/R/MINEF/DF/SDIAF/SI relatif à l’avis d’appel d’offres pour l’attribution des 52 ventes de coupe #0415/AAO/MINEF/DF/SDIAF du 6 juillet 2000" announce that 52 ventes de coupe are available, but lists 56 ventes de coupe.
¹⁴ Yvan Cusson (Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts), private communication, November 2000.
¹⁵ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000
¹⁶ Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts, Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière - Suivi et révision - Exercice 2000-2003. (Yaoundé:MINEF, 2000)
¹⁷ But MINEF advertised in Cameroun Tribune (July 12, 2000) that it was placing 21 UFAs on the next auction bloc (see Table 3).
¹⁸ Décision 3765/CR/MINEF/CAB du 15 décembre 1999.
¹⁹ A Cameroonian legal firm, Behlé et Associés.  
²⁰ Behlé et Associés, Rapport de l'observateur independent (Commission Interministerielle d'attribution des concessions forestières, Juillet 2000).
²¹ Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts, Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière (Yaoundé:MINEF, 1999).
²² Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000.
²³ Cameroon Tribune, July 12, 2000.
²⁴ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, January 2001.
²⁵ Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement, Poster sur la Loi 94/01.
²⁶ Décision 1305 D/MINEF/DF/CFC du 23 octobre 2000.
²⁷ Communiqué de presse No. 832/PR/MINEF/CAB/CC/VGM du 17 août 2000.
²⁸ Arrêté numéro 0276 du MINEF du 13 mars 2000, fixant les critères de séléction et les procédures de choix des soumissionaires des titres d'exploitation forestière.
²⁹ Arrêté No. 0758/MINEF du 16 juin 1999
³⁰ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000.
³¹ Arrêté numéro 0276 du MINEF du 13 mars 2000, fixant les critères de séléction et les procédures de choix des soumissionaires des titres d'exploitation forestière.
³² Ursule Zang Zang (SIGIF), private communication, November 2000.
³³ Yvan Cusson (Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts), private communication, September 2000.
³⁴ Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts, Rapport de la Mission d’Evaluation des Progrès Réalisés sur les Concessions Forestières Attribuées en 1997 dans la Province de l'Est. (Yaoundé:MINEF, 1999)
³⁵ These 7 ventes de coupe were possibly not bidden on by Cameroonian companies, which would explain why they were allocated to foreign companies. However, this explanation has not been confirmed.
³⁶ Note that this differs from the 17 UFAs scheduled to be allocated according to MINEF’s document Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière. (Yaoundé:MINEF, 1999)
³⁷ Based on the results of the Rapport de synthèse de l’ouverture des propositions techniques et administratives par la Commission Interministerielle d'Attribution des Concessions Forestières.
³⁸ This 6 percent represents 1.4 million hectares, but is actually an underestimation because the calculation only accounts for mapped UFAs. A few UFAs and all ventes de coupe were not counted in this calculation. In addition, the area calculation is based on spatial (GIS) data whereas the areas discussed in this document are based on reported area by the government.
³⁹ This calculation only accounts for mapped UFAs. A few UFAs and all ventes de coupe were not counted in this calculation. In addition, the area calculation is based on spatial (GIS) data whereas the areas discussed in this document are based on reported area by the government.
⁴⁰ In addition to the 16 million hectares of forest in mapped concessions, an additional 194,000 hectares (in two concessions) remain unmapped because geographic boundaries were not available. The amount of forest estimated to be in concessions differs slightly from values reported in An Overview of Logging in Cameroon (2000) because of differences in concession areas reported by the government from areas calculated using GIS. Where digitized boundaries were not available for the 2000 report, we assumed the entire area of unmapped concession reported by the government to be forested. However, the concession area for mapped concession is 95% forested. Global Forest Watch now has the boundaries of 12 concessions that were not mapped in the 2000 report. Our current estimate should therefore be more accurate than what we reported in 2000, but these values should be regarded as estimates because they were derived using data whose spatial accuracy has not been determined.
⁴¹ Based on Rapport de synthèse de l’ouverture des propositions techniques et administratives par la Commission Interministerielle d'Attribution des Concessions Forestières.
⁴² Global Forest Watch, An Overview of Logging in Cameroon (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000).
⁴³ Ursule Zang Zang (SIGIF), private communication, October 2000.
⁴⁴ Felix Pirotton (Soutien au Développement Durable de Lomié, SNV), private communication, November 2000.
⁴⁵ Communiqué du 15 mars 2000 du Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts publié dans "Cameroon Tribune" du vendredi 24 mars 2000
⁴⁶ Nicole Sabeh (Ingénierie Forestière), private communication. January 2001.
⁴⁷ Alain Chaudron, Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts, private communication. January 2001.
⁴⁸ These companies are: Alpicam, La Forestière de Campo (Bolloré), Propalmbois (Thanry), MMG (Wijma), SN COCAM, SCTCB, Ingénierie Forestière and SIBAF.
⁴⁹ Global Forest Watch, Cameroon's Timber Processing Industry (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, in press).
⁵⁰ A project by the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV).
⁵¹ Projet Soutien au Développement Durable de Lomié, Une première: la signature des conventions de gestion des cinq premières forêts communautaires (Organisation Néerlandaise de Développement).
⁵² Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts, Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière (Yaoundé:MINEF, 1999).
⁵³ Global Forest Watch, An Overview of Logging in Cameroon (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000). It should be noted that MINEF has adjusted some "published" concession areas since the publication of this report.
⁵⁴ Global Forest Watch, An Overview of Logging in Cameroon (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000).
⁵⁵ Communiqué du 15 mars 2000 du Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts publié dans "Cameroon Tribune" du vendredi 24 mars 2000; Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts, Rapport de synthèse de l’ouverture des propositions techniques et administratives par la Commission Interministerielle d'Attribution des Concessions Forestières.
⁵⁶ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000.
⁵⁷ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000.
⁵⁸ Procès verbal de la Commission Interministerielle d’Attribution des Concessions Forestières (session de juin 2000)
⁵⁹ For more details, see Global Witness' "Monitoring report of control mission" (July 2000).
⁶⁰ SEBAC/SEFAC was found (illegally) logging UFA 10.009, documented in Rapport de la Mission d’Evaluation des Progrès Réalisés sur les Concessions Forestières Attribuées en 1997 dans la Province de l'Est (MINEF, 1999).
⁶¹ Internal World Wildlife Fund report, January 2000.
⁶² Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts, Plannification de l’Attribution des Titres d’Exploitation Forestière. (Yaoundé:MINEF, 1999).
⁶³ Filip Verbelen (Greenpeace), private communication, September 2000.
⁶⁴ Laurent Debroux (World Bank), private communication, November 2000.

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